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INTRODUCTION
The 2000 election was a wake-up call for America, demonstrat-
ing the vulnerability of the democratic process to breakdowns of vot-
ing technology, election law, and election administration. It shamed
states and the federal government into action, yielding, in its most
expansive (and expensive) manifestation, the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA) of 2002.1 HAVA contained many provisions; the one that
most concretely addressed the Florida recount controversy required
states to phase out mechanical lever machines and punch card voting.
Hundreds of millions of federal dollars were authorized to underwrite
this requirement.
The implementation of HAVA funds yielded equipment upgrades
that, in turn, led to the recovery of at least a million votes in the 2004
* Kenan Sahin Distinguished Professor of Political Science, MIT, Cambridge,
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2006).
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and 2008 presidential elections—votes that would have otherwise
been lost because of the decrepitude of punch card and mechanical
lever voting machines. HAVA increased the likelihood that a voter
who wakes up on Election Day intending to vote, and then does every-
thing required of him to cast a ballot, will have his vote counted as
intended.
HAVA solved one set of problems, reducing “lost votes” due to
voting technology failures, but it failed to address others. In particular,
HAVA has been less effective in strengthening all of the ties that bind
a citizen’s desire to vote to the successful completion of the act. Tech-
nological failures are only one reason why votes are lost. HAVA ad-
dressed other reasons, such as registration problems and poor polling
place practices; however, with the exception of the requirement that
states maintain centralized voter registration lists, HAVA only ad-
dressed these reasons indirectly.
In retrospect, the biggest shortcoming of HAVA may have been
its virtual lack of attention to voting by mail. As legislators respond to
calls to make voting more convenient, and public officials respond to
demands to make elections less costly, voting by mail is becoming
more prevalent.2 Yet despite the increasing prevalence of vote-by-
mail, there has been virtual silence on the question of whether it
causes more lost votes, compared to the in-person modes it is
replacing.
Compared to in-person voting, either in traditional precincts on
Election Day or in early-voting centers, vote-by-mail is highly decen-
tralized. It relies on millions of people who are unschooled in election
law and out of the sight of election administrators to perform a series
of clerical tasks they otherwise rarely encounter. The chain-of-custody
of ballots is less exacting. There are fewer opportunities to correct
mistakes or clarify how to mark the ballot. Finally, the technological
safeguards mandated by HAVA to protect against unintended over-
and under-votes do not exist.
The trend toward vote-by-mail raises the question about whether
the gains of HAVA, which have cured many of the ills of in-person
2. See, e.g., Paul Gronke & Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, The Growth of Early and
Non-Precinct Place Balloting: When, Why, and Prospects for the Future, in AMERICA
VOTES! A GUIDE TO ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 261, 268–72 (Ben Griffith
ed., 2008) [hereinafter Gronke & Galanes-Rosenbaum, The Growth of Early and Non-
Precinct Place Balloting]; Paul Gronke, Early Voting Reforms and American Elec-
tions, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 423, 423–24 (2008) [hereinafter Gronke, Early
Voting Reforms]; Paul Gronke et al., Convenience Voting, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
437, 438 (2008) [hereinafter Gronke, Convenience Voting].
\\server05\productn\N\NYL\13-3\NYL305.txt unknown Seq: 3  6-DEC-10 11:39
2010] LOSING VOTES BY MAIL 575
voting, may be undercut by the short-comings of this alternative vot-
ing method.
The answer to this question is mixed and preliminary. It is mixed
because the best evidence suggests that the pipeline that moves mail
ballots between voters and election officials is very leaky. On the
other hand, the rise of voting-by-mail has not caused a precipitous rise
in the residual vote rate, despite the lack of technological safeguards
against over- and under-voting. The answer is preliminary because the
quality of the best evidence we have is highly variable and reliant on
reports from state election officials, who have fifty different ways of
defining and gathering data about mail-in ballots. Some of the evi-
dence also relies on the recalled memories of voters, who may have
psychic incentives to blame others (i.e., election administrators) for
their failures to vote.
The larger purpose of this paper is not to argue that voting meth-
ods that rely on the mail, whether they are mail-in absentee ballots or
Oregon’s statewide vote-by-mail system, do or must result in an inor-
dinate number of lost votes.3 Rather, this paper aims to show that we
should be monitoring the lost-votes problem in the context of voting
by mail, and that the current state of post-election data gathering is
insufficient to identify where the biggest problems with vote-by-mail
exist.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, I frame
the problem of lost votes by introducing the notion of a “voting pipe-
line,” which is inspired by the 2001 report of the Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project (VTP), which articulated a holistic perspective of
the lost-votes problem in the context of voting in-person on Election
Day.4 Second, I apply that metaphor to the vote-by-mail system and
demonstrate that the voting pipeline in this context has many more
weak points. Third, having framed the issue, I discuss the rise of vote-
by-mail over the past four decades and identify the regions of the
country in which the practice has become more prevalent. Fourth, re-
lying on data from a unique public opinion survey, the Survey of the
3. The reader should be alerted to the fact that I generally treat vote-by-mail and
absentee voting as synonymous. When the distinction is important, they are distin-
guished in the text. Almost all absentee voting is by mail, but some absentee ballots
are cast in-person in election departments. In states that conduct all voting by mail,
such as Oregon, it is technically a misnomer to refer to this as absentee voting. Over-
all, though, the variety in nomenclature is a set of distinctions without a difference, as
far as addressing the first order set of theoretical and empirical issues is concerned.
4. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS/WHAT
COULD BE (2001), http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/voting_what_is_what_
could_be.pdf.
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Performance of American Elections (SPAE) and the Election Assis-
tance Commission’s 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey
(EAVS),5 I show that the number of lost votes through the vote-by-
mail system in 2008 may have been as large as 7.6 million, or approxi-
mately one in five individuals who attempted to vote by mail. These
votes were lost largely because of problems in the distribution system
of mail-in ballots. There is little evidence that the vote-by-mail system
is prone to excessive residual vote rates, despite the lack of feedback
mechanisms that are supposed to alert in-precinct voters that they have
over- or under-voted their ballots.
I conclude by considering some objections to the analysis I pro-
vide, in order to suggest an agenda for addressing the lost-vote prob-
lem along the vote-by-mail path. Three points are emphasized. First,
addressing the lost-vote problem in the vote-by-mail context depends
critically on improving the data-gathering and -analysis capacity in the
domain of election administration. Second, progress will not be made
in addressing the problems identified in this paper without more care-
ful attention to the normative position that voting-by-mail occupies in
American elections. Third, the empirical investigation of problems as-
sociated with voting-by-mail will be assisted by making sharper dis-
tinctions between situations in which voters are allowed to vote by
mail, as opposed to required to vote by mail.
I.
THE VOTING PIPELINE AND LOST VOTES, 2000 TO 2008
In their 2001 report, Voting: What Is/What Could Be?, the
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP) argued that we will
significantly underestimate the size of the lost vote problem if we fo-
cus only on voter confusion (illustrated by the butterfly ballot) and
equipment malfunctions (illustrated by hanging chad) and fail to grasp
the process of voting more holistically.6 Figure 1 illustrates this line of
thinking, using the metaphor of a pipeline.
5. R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ ET AL., CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT,
2008 SURVEY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2008), http://vote.
caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/Final%20report20090218.pdf [hereinafter SPAE]; U.S.
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2008 ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING
SURVEY (2009), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2008%20Election%20
Administration%20and%20Voting%20Survey%20EAVS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter
2008 EAVS].
6. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 4, at 8–9 (explaining
that votes were lost for a number of reasons besides problems with voting
technology).
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FIGURE 1: THE VOTING PIPELINE AND LOST VOTES IN 2000
Source: Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is/What Could Be
(2001), http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/voting_what_is_what_could_be.pdf.
In thinking about the voting pipeline, it is helpful to imagine a
representative voter who wakes up on Election Day intending to vote
for her favored candidate for President. For this voter, “success” con-
sists of having her vote recorded as she intended when the final tally is
complete. To achieve success, four steps in a stylized election admin-
istration system must be navigated successfully. First, the voter must
locate the polling place, travel there, and get to the front of the check-
in line.7 Second, the voter must identify herself and have her identity
verified.8 Third, she must use the equipment, and it must function
flawlessly.9 Fourth, the vote must be counted accurately.10
Using the 2000 Voting and Registration Supplement (VRS) of
the Current Population Survey, the VTP estimated that almost one
million would-be voters had their efforts to vote thwarted by polling
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. This fourth step, the accurate counting of votes, was not included in the original
VTP formulation. However, as scholars have continued to explore how to improve
elections, the problem of making sure votes are counted accurately has become a great
concern, especially among those who are worried about the functioning of “black
box” electronic voting machines. See, e.g., Donald P. Moynihan, Building Secure
Elections: E-Voting, Security, and Systems Theory, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 515,
518–20 (2004). See generally BEV HARRIS, BLACK BOX VOTING: BALLOT TAMPERING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004). A series of international vote-counting controversies in
countries like Ukraine, Iran, and Afghanistan have also sensitized many to the reality
of vote tampering after ballots have been cast. See MIKHAIL MYAGKOV ET AL., THE
FORENSICS OF ELECTION FRAUD: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 138 (2009); Walter R.
Mebane, Jr., Fraud in the 2009 Presidential Election in Iran?, 23 CHANCE 6, 6
(2010); Scott Worden, Afghanistan: An Election Gone Awry, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 11,
18–19 (2010). There is currently no way to estimate the extent of this problem in the
United States, but it is an important potential source of losses in the voting pipeline
that deserves to be acknowledged. For efforts to quantify, or at least identify, tamper-
ing with vote totals, see generally MAYAGKOV ET AL., supra; Mebane, Jr., supra;
Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Election Forensics: The Second-Digit Benford’s Law Test and
Recent American Presidential Elections, in ELECTION FRAUD: DETECTION, PREVEN-
TION, AND CONSEQUENCES (R. Michael Alvarez et al. eds., 2008).
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place practices (i.e., long lines), and that between 1.5 and 3.0 million
would-be voters had registration problems that kept them from vot-
ing.11 Relying on statistical analysis of residual votes from 1988 to
2000, they also estimated that between 1.5 and 2.0 million votes were
lost because of machine-related problems.12 The VTP study did not
originally identify the problem of accurately counting votes as part of
the pipeline, so it failed to estimate the number of lost votes here.13
Approximately 105.4 million votes were recorded in the 2000
presidential election.14 Working backward along the pipeline, adding
in the four to six million votes that were “lost” when a link of the
voting chain broke in 2000, as just described, we can estimate that
109.4 to 111.4 million people “woke up on Election Day intending to
vote.”
We can update these estimates using subsequent analysis. Later
research estimated that, compared to 2000, approximately one million
fewer votes were lost in 2004 because of machine problems;15 it is
reasonable to conclude that an additional half million votes were re-
covered because of the upgrades to voting machines that occurred be-
tween 2004 and 2008. Fewer respondents mentioned registration
problems as a reason for not voting in 2004 and 2008 versus 2000,
although the percentage of non-voters who blamed polling place prac-
tices was virtually unchanged across the same time period.16 There-
11. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 4, at 9.
12. Id.
13. In all likelihood, the number of votes lost due to tabulation errors is already
included in the number of machine-related problems. An example is provided by the
2008 election in the Republic of Georgia, in which a car carrying ballots to the central
vote-counting center in Tbilisi was involved in an automobile accident that resulted in
nearly all the ballot papers being lost. Ballot Papers Lost in Car Accident in Georgia,
RIA NOVISTI (June 1, 2008, 12:46 PM), http://en.rian.ru/world/20080106/95543298.
html. If this had occurred in most American jurisdictions, the fact that voters had
checked in at the polls would have established that they had voted, but the aggregate
vote result would fail to record an actual vote. To the outside observer, a vote lost
because paper ballots have been lost in a car accident before they have been counted
is indistinguishable from a vote lost due to an under-voted ballot.
14. David Leip, 2000 Presidential General Election Results, DAVE LEIP’S ATLAS
OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?
year=2000&off=0&f=1 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
15. Charles Stewart III, Residual Vote in the 2004 Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 158,
158 (2006).
16. Compare THOM FILE & SARAH CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-562, VOT-
ING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2008 14 (2010), http://
www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf [hereinafter 2008 VRS] (5.5% reporting
“registration problems”), and KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-556, VOT-
ING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004 15 (2006), http://
www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf [hereinafter 2004 VRS] (6.6% reporting
“registration problems”), with AMIE JAMIESON ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-
\\server05\productn\N\NYL\13-3\NYL305.txt unknown Seq: 7  6-DEC-10 11:39
2010] LOSING VOTES BY MAIL 579
fore, if voters had faced the same conditions in 2000 as they did in
2008, there would have been one million fewer lost votes due to
equipment problems and approximately half a million fewer lost votes
due to registration problems.17 This represents an overall reduction in
lost votes in the range of 20–30%, most of which can be attributed to
efforts associated with the implementation of HAVA.
II.
THE VOTE-BY-MAIL PIPELINE
One flaw with the description of the voting pipeline is that for
many voters, the decision to vote is not made on Election Day. It may
be made days or weeks ahead of time, when the voter decides whether
to vote by mail (usually absentee) or wait until Election Day. If the
voter decides to wait until Election Day, then the pipeline illustrated in
Figure 1 still applies. However, if the voter decides to use the mail
route, a different pipeline is involved.
Figure 2 provides a schematic voting pipeline that includes the
possibility of vote-by-mail. The first decision is whether to vote in-
person or by mail.18 If the voter decides to vote in person, then the
pipeline proceeds as before. If the voter decides to vote by mail, then
the new pipeline is illustrated by the bottom track.
With the exception of voters in Oregon, Washington, and places
with permanent absentee voting, the vote-by-mail process begins
when the voter requests a ballot.19 The first leak in the pipeline can
542, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2000 10 (2002),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf [hereinafter 2000 VRS] (7.4% re-
porting “registration problems”).
17. In 2000, the percentage citing “registration problems” in the VRS as a reason
for not voting was 7.4%. 2000 VRS, supra note 16. That number fell to 6.6% in 2004 R
and 5.5% in 2008. 2004 VRS, supra note 16; 2008 VRS, supra note 16. These num- R
bers differ from those reported in the final VRS reports, but were obtained directly
from the Census Bureau’s public use data. The datasets are available at the Census
Bureau’s DataFerrett website. DataFerrett, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://datafer-
rett.census.gov/index.html (last visited October 12, 2010). Those citing “inconvenient
polling place or hours or lines too long” in the VRS amounted to 2.8% of non-voters
in 2000 and 2.9% in 2004 and 2008. 2000 VRS, supra note 16; 2004 VRS, supra note R
16; 2008 VRS, supra note 16. Below, I estimate that the total number of non-voting R
registered voters in 2008 was 57.6 million, compared to 40 million non-voters in
2000. Therefore, the absolute number of votes lost due to polling place practices and
registration problems may have risen over the decade, but that is only because the
number of non-voters has grown.
18. I assume that issues related to early in-person voting may be treated as simply a
part of traditional in-precinct voting. This assumption may or may not be reasonable,
but it does not affect the line of reasoning that follows.
19. According to the 2008 EAVS Report, fifteen states maintained permanent ab-
sentee ballot databases in 2008. 2008 EAVS, supra note 5, at 9. 37% of absentee
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FIGURE 2: THE VOTE-BY-MAIL PIPELINE
occur if the request is never received. If it is received, then a leak can
occur at the point of verifying the voter’s identity and eligibility to
receive a ballot. If there is a registration problem, this too represents a
leak. If the ID is validated, then a ballot is sent to the voter to be cast.
If the voter does not receive the mailed ballot, another pipeline leak
occurs. Once the voter marks the ballot, it is returned—but it can get
lost in the return mail, yet another potential leak. If the ballot is re-
turned for counting, it must again undergo identification verification.
If there is a registration error that did not manifest earlier, another vote
leaks from the pipeline. The final step is the accurate tabulation of the
returned ballot.
Before considering the likelihood of problems to emerge at each
step, a few things leap out at us when we compare the top and bottom
tracks of Figure 2. First, there are simply more ways to lose votes
along the bottom than along the top. It can be argued that this is be-
cause the bottom track is described at a greater degree of granularity
than the top, but this argument brings us to the second major point: the
reason the bottom path provides more ways to lose votes is that many
steps of the vote-by-mail process have to be accomplished twice. The
voter sends two pieces of mail to the central elections office: (1) the
request for the absentee and (2) the absentee ballot itself.20 Only a
ballots transmitted in 2008 were off of these permanent lists. Id. at 38. If we include
the transmission of mail ballots from Oregon and Washington in this calculation, the
percentage of automatic transmissions approaches 50%.
20. Of course, the “first piece of mail” could actually be a phone call or a visit to
the elections office, but the point remains that the voter has to navigate the elections
office twice when it comes to mail-in ballots.
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miniscule fraction of the mail is actually lost, but navigating mail
channels involves more than simply surviving the U.S. Postal Service,
including, for example, the handling and sorting process at both ends
of a letter’s journey.21 We simply do not know how reliable the sys-
tem is once a ballot has left the hands of a postal worker.
Below, I estimate how many votes are lost at every point along
the pipeline. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the opportuni-
ties to lose votes appear to be greater along the mail route than along
the in-person route.
III.
THE RISE OF VOTE-BY-MAIL SINCE 1972
The logistics of requesting and delivering absentee ballots intro-
duce more opportunities for lost votes. In order to estimate the poten-
tial magnitude of the problem, I start by reviewing the rise of voting-
by-mail over the past four decades.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of ballots cast by mail in federal
elections from 1972 to 2008. The estimates are provided by the VRS
and are based on self-reporting in a national survey (the Census Bu-
reau did not gather information about voting mode in 1988).22 The
prevalence of mail-in ballots has grown exponentially since 1972.23
The pace of growth has quickened over the past decade, as more states
have relaxed their “for cause” absentee laws, developed permanent
absentee ballot databases, and mandated the use of the mails for an
21. The United States Postal Service (USPS) does not release estimates of the num-
ber of letters that are never delivered. However, in its most recent statistical report, the
USPS did report that the average piece of pre-sorted first-class mail was delivered in
2.3 days, with 99.9% of mail delivered within ten days. See U.S. POSTAL QUARTERLY
STATISTICS REPORT: POSTAL QUARTER III FISCAL YEAR 2010 81 (2010), http://
www.usps.com/financials/_pdf/QSR_FY10QT3.pdf.
22. 2008 VRS, supra note 16, at 1. The EAVS collects reports from states about the R
actual number of ballots cast, including mode (in-person, civilian absentee, etc.). Al-
though the response rate in 2008 was nearly 100%, in previous years, the survey
suffered from significant non-response problems. Compare 2008 EAVS, supra note
5, at 16 (showing response rates for all questions above 70%, with most above 90%),
with KIMBALL W. BRACE & MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE
COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE 2004 ELECTION DAY SURVEY 1-6 (2005), http://www.
eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2004%20Election%20Administration%20and%20Voting
%20Survey%20Report%20EAVS%20with%20tables.zip (“Even with the follow-up
review, many responses to the Election Day Survey are incomplete.”), and U.S. ELEC-
TION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, THE 2006 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SUR-
VEY 27 (2007), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/2006%20EAVS%20
Report%20(All%20Chapters).pdf (showing response rates as low as 35.5% for some
questions). Because we cannot use EAC data to describe the long-term trend, I rely on
the Census Bureau self-reports, which are cross-validated by the EAC data for 2008.
23. See infra Figure 3.
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increasing number of voters.24 Approximately 16% of all ballots cast
for president in 2008 were sent through the mails.25
FIGURE 3: THE RISE OF VOTING BY MAIL, 1972–2008
PERCENT OF BALLOTS CAST BY MAIL
Source: Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supple-
ment, various years.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of ballots cast by mail in each
state in 2008, estimated using the VRS.26 Self-reported mail-in ballots
ranged from 1.9% of respondents in West Virginia to 97.5% of re-
spondents in Oregon. The laws and practices of the states have a sig-
nificant influence over these absentee rates. In the twenty-seven states
that allowed “no-excuse” absentee voting by mail in 2008,27 22% of
ballots were cast by mail, compared to 6.0% of ballots in the twenty-
one states and the District of Columbia that still require an excuse to
vote absentee. Focusing only on the no-excuse states, the twelve with
permanent absentee voting saw 39.8% of their ballots cast by mail,
compared to an 11.2% mail rate in no-excuse states without permanent
absentee voting.
24. Id.
25. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2008 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND
VOTING SURVEY DATASET (2009), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2008%20
EAVS%20XLS.zip [hereinafter EAVS DATASET]. Based on the 2008 EAVS dataset,
it appears that 4% of the mail-in ballots were from overseas, with the rest being either
traditional absentee ballots or by-mail ballots from jurisdictions that mandate it.
26. Inconsistencies across states in reporting statistics about absentee ballots pre-
clude our use of the 2008 EAVS dataset to make this estimate. Forty-four states pro-
vided data about absentee voting that appear to be usable in the EAVS dataset.
Focusing on these forty-four states, the cross-state correlation between the EAC data,
which are based on ballot counts from election officials, and the Census Bureau data,
which are based on self-reports from voters, is .97 (weighting each state by total
turnout). Overall, the Census Bureau estimate among these forty-four states is (on
aggregate) about 2.4 percentage points lower than the EAC count.
27. Oregon and Washington are excluded from this analysis. For a summary of
absentee ballot laws see generally Pre-Election Day and Absentee Voting by Mail
Rules, ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.
pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/e%20and%20a%20voting%20laws.pdf.
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FIGURE 4: STATE VOTE-BY-MAIL IN 2008
Source: Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supple-
ment, 2008.
Although mail is currently the minority mode for voting, it is
growing, and growing faster in some places than others. In nine states,
over 20% of voters use the mails. Because of concerns about the costs
and logistical headaches associated with in-precinct voting, election
officials in many parts of the country feel compelled to respond to
citizen demands for greater convenience by expanding vote-by-mail
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options.28 However, for the reasons discussed in Part II, this trend
raises questions about whether the voting pipeline is becoming more
and more fragile for voters in these states.
IV.
AN ESTIMATE OF LOST VOTES IN THE 2008
VOTE-BY-MAIL SYSTEM
Estimating the strength of the vote-by-mail pipeline requires
knowledge of how many registered voters attempted to use the mail to
vote in 2008 and how many were successful. Estimating the strength
of the vote-by-mail system requires us to have solid figures pertaining
to all the possible sources of vote loss that were identified in Figure 2.
Although election data for the purposes of diagnosing problems with
the election system are better than they used to be, they are unfortu-
nately still a work-in-progress. Therefore, this section takes a first stab
at measuring lost votes along the voting-by-mail channel, but these
estimates should be considered illustrative, not definitive.
I rely on two data sources. The first is the EAC’s 2008 Election
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS).29 The second is a national
survey conducted by a team of researchers who were associated with
the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project and funded by the Pew
Charitable Trusts, the 2008 Survey of the Performance of American
Elections (SPAE).30 The EAVS data give us insights into most of the
internal processes involving mail ballots. The SPAE data are useful
for estimating how many individuals actually requested an absentee
ballot.
EAVS was conducted by sending a survey to election officials in
each state, who were asked to provide a large amount of data about
election administration in each county for the November 2008 elec-
tion.31 Data gathered included the total number of ballots cast, the
number of ballots cast by domestic absentee and overseas (UO-
28. See, e.g., Gronke, Early Voting Reforms, supra note 2, at 427–28; Gronke, R
Convenience Voting, supra note 2, at 438; Gronke & Galanes-Rosenbaum, The R
Growth of Early and Non-Precinct Place Balloting, supra note 2, at 270–71. R
29. EAVS Dataset, supra note 25. R
30. SPAE, supra note 5. The 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elec-
tions was generously funded by a grant from the Pew Center of the States, through
their Make Voting Work initiative, along with the JEHT Foundation and the Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons (AARP). The analysis presented here is solely the
responsibility of the author.
31. 2008 EAVS, supra note 5. For New England, the survey asked that the data be
broken down by municipality, not county. Id. at 18.
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CAVA)32 ballots, and the number of precincts in the county, among
other facts.33 Although the response rate for the 2008 survey was sig-
nificantly improved over the 2004 and 2006 versions of this survey,
the dataset is still incomplete. For instance, three states (Alabama,
Massachusetts, and South Carolina) did not provide a breakdown of
ballots by type.34 Furthermore, in six jurisdictions (Connecticut, D.C.,
Hawaii, Indiana, Nebraska, and Texas) the sum of all votes cast in the
different categories exceeded the total number of ballots cast in the
jurisdiction.35
Although the EAVS data have limitations, they are the best data
available for assessing most of the details of election administration.
Problems with missing and inconsistent data in the domestic absentee
portion of the survey are minimal, so any conclusions we draw should
be robust with reference to decisions about how to impute missing
data. With these cautions in mind about the quality of the data, I esti-
mate that 27.9 million ballots were cast by mail in 2008. This estimate
is based on the EAVS data, including data that must be imputed be-
cause of missing values.36 The number of ballots transmitted to voters
and returned to be counted can be estimated using the EAVS dataset.
A. Estimating the Number of Mail-In Ballots Transmitted to Voters
EAVS contains a variable for the number of domestic absentee
ballots transmitted to voters, which is used as the estimate for forty of
the states.37 Two states reported precisely zero absentee ballots trans-
mitted, Alabama and Washington.38 To create an estimate for Ala-
bama, I multiplied the Census Bureau’s estimate of the percentage of
ballots cast via mail times the number of ballots counted for President.
Washington, which conducted all balloting by mail in every county
except one, did not report the number of mail ballots that were trans-
32. These ballots are regulated by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to ff-6 (2006).
33. 2008 EAVS, supra note 5.
34. 2008 EAVS Dataset, supra note 25. Alabama provided a report for the number R
of domestic absentee ballots cast but otherwise did not provide an estimate of the
number of ballots cast in precincts.
35. Id.
36. This estimate exceeds the EAVS report of 25.6 million absentee ballots counted
in 2008, for several reasons. The major reason for the deviation from the raw EAVS
report is that I have added the mail-in ballots cast in Oregon and Washington, which
were not counted as absentee votes. I also imputed missing data for some counties and
states that did not report the necessary statistics to the EAC. These imputations are
less critical for the estimates that follow.
37. EAVS Dataset, supra note 25, variable C1a. R
38. EAVS Dataset, supra note 25. R
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mitted to voters in the thirty-eight counties with mail ballots.39 Be-
cause Washington mailed ballots to all registered voters, except those
in Pierce County, my estimate of the number of transmitted ballots is
equal to the number of registered voters in the state, excluding Pierce
County.
Oregon, which conducts all its elections by mail, did not report
the number of transmitted ballots, but did report a small number
(19,782) of ballots transmitted to voters through a separate absentee
procedure.40 To estimate the number of transmitted mail ballots in Or-
egon, I used the number of registered voters in that state, as well.
Oregon, like Washington, automatically mails ballots to all registered
voters, at their registration address.41
In the remaining eight states, at least one county failed to report
the number of mail ballots transmitted to voters, resulting in an under-
reporting in each of these states.42 Therefore, I imputed the number of
transmitted ballots by multiplying the Census Bureau estimate of the
percentage of ballots cast through the mails for the entire state by the
number of ballots counted in the county with the missing data. This
produces an under-estimate of the number of transmitted ballots in
these states, but the error is likely to be small, because the missing
counties are few and tend to have small voting populations.
Accounting for these corrections, I estimate that 31.6 million bal-
lots were transmitted from election officials to voters via the mail in
2008.
B. Estimating the Number of Mail Ballots Returned for Counting
The number of ballots that were returned to election officials for
counting is captured in a single EAVS question, which was answered
in full by thirty-eight states.43
For Alabama, Oregon, and Washington—states that did not re-
port the number of ballots returned for counting—I assumed the return
rate was the same as the return rate for all states that did report the
number of returned ballots, which was 90.8%.44 I then multiplied this
percentage by the number of transmitted ballots that were imputed for
these three states to establish the estimate of the number of returned
ballots.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. OR. REV. STAT. § 254.465 (2009).
42. EAVS Dataset, supra note 25. R
43. Id., variable C1b.
44. Id.
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Connecticut reported more ballots returned than transmitted.45
Therefore, I set the number of returned ballots equal to the number
transmitted.
The nine remaining states were missing data from at least one
county.46 For these nine states, I calculated the return rate in the coun-
ties that had reported a full set of data. Then, for each state, I took the
state’s overall return rate (for the counties with complete data) and
multiplied it by the number of transmitted ballots reported for any
county with missing data.
After making all the described imputations, I estimate that 28.7
million ballots were returned for counting in 2008.
C. Estimating the Number of Ballots Counted
The next step is to estimate the number of ballots counted. The
beginning point for this estimation is the EAVS question that records
the number of domestic absentee ballots that were counted.47
Forty-two states reported complete data for the relevant ques-
tion,48 leaving values for nine states to be imputed. The values for
Alabama and Washington were imputed by first calculating the overall
rate of returned ballots counted for the states with a full set of data.
This rate was 97.4%. I then multiplied this percentage by the imputed
number of returned ballots for these two states to produce the esti-
mates. The number of counted mail ballots for Oregon was set to
match the reported turnout for the state.
The remaining states had data missing for one or more counties.
For each of these states, I calculated the “counting rate” within the
state, using the counties that had the requisite data. I then multiplied
the state counting rate by the number of returned ballots in the county
to fill in the missing values for these counties.
Using this method, I estimate that 27.9 million mail ballots were
counted nationwide.
D. Estimating the Number of Requested Ballots
Finally, I turn to the number of people who actually requested an
absentee ballot. This is not an issue probed in the EAVS, but it is an
issue examined by the 2008 Study of the Performance of American
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id., variable C4a.
48. Id.
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Elections (SPAE).49 The SPAE was a nationwide post-election survey
of 10,000 registered voters in November 2008 that focused on a series
of election administration issues, from the perspective of voters.50 The
survey contained questions that can help to quantify the number of
initial mail ballot requests, particularly the number of unfulfilled re-
quests. For the foregoing analysis, all results have been weighted so
that the sample reflects a national cross-section of registered voters.
The SPAE asked registered voters whether they voted in the 2008
November general election.51 It then asked voters which mode they
used to vote—in-person on Election Day, in-person before Election
Day, or by mail.52 Registered voters who reported that they did not
vote were then asked several follow-up questions. One such question
was the following:
Sometimes when voters can’t get to the polls on Election Day, they
vote using an absentee ballot. Please indicate which of the follow-
ing statements most closely describes why you did not vote absen-
tee in the November 2008 General Election.53
Among the response categories was the answer, “I requested an
absentee ballot, but it never came;” 6.8% of non-voters chose this re-
sponse.54 If we use the best estimate of the number of registered non-
voters in 2008, 57.6 million,55 then the estimated number of requests
for absentee ballots that went unfulfilled is 6.8% of 57.6 million,
which is 3.9 million.
Above, I estimated that 31.6 million mail ballots were transmitted
from election offices to voters. If we add the 3.9 million estimate of
49. SPAE, supra note 5, at 26.
50. Id. at i. The SPAE also included a parallel telephone survey that was conducted
in ten states, to cross-validate the results of the Internet survey. Id. at 3. The telephone
responses have been omitted from this analysis.
51. Id. at 162 (question Q1).
52. Id. at 163 (question Q5).
53. Id. (question Q3).
54. Id. The response categories were “I had no interest in voting in this election”
(24.0% of responses); “It was too late to request an absentee ballot once I thought
about it” (11.1%); “I requested an absentee ballot, but it never came” (6.8%); “I
wouldn’t have been allowed to vote absentee according to my state’s election law”
(4.1%); “Requesting an absentee ballot requires too much effort” (2.2%); “I didn’t
know how to request an absentee ballot” (21.8%); and “Other” (9.8%). Id.
55. The 57.6 million figure is arrived at as follows. The 2008 EAVS Report esti-
mates that 190.1 million Americans were registered to vote in 2008. 2008 EAVS,
supra note 5, at 8. David Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections reports that 131.5
million votes were cast for president in 2008. David Leip, 2008 Presidential General
Election Results, DAVE LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselec-
tionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2008&off=0&f=1 (last visited Oct. 19,
2010). Therefore, 190.1 million minus 132.5 million equals 57.6 million, the esti-
mated number of registered non-voters in 2008.
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unfulfilled mail ballot requests to the number of estimated mail trans-
missions, we determine that 35.5 million Americans requested absen-
tee ballots in 2008.
E. Summarizing the Calculations
Figure 5 provides a summary of these calculations. In words:
• 35.5 million requests were made for a mail ballot in 2008. Of
these,
° 3.9 million requests were unfulfilled, leaving
• 31.6 million mail-ballots transmitted to voters. Of these,
° 2.9 million were not returned for counting, leaving
• 28.7 million mail-ballots returned for counting. Of these,
° 0.8 million mail-ballots were not counted, leaving a total
of
• 27.9 million absentee ballots counted in 2008.
FIGURE 5: LOST VOTES FROM MAIL-IN-BALLOTS
If we add together the estimated number of people whose ballot
requests were unfulfilled, the number of ballots not returned for count-
ing, and the returned ballots that were not counted, we determine that
a total of 7.6 million votes left the mail-ballot pipeline at some point
between requesting a ballot and the counting of the ballots. This
amounts to 21% of all ballot requests.
What should we glean from these estimates? First, the 7.6 million
figure (or the 21% rate) should not be taken as a firm measure of the
number of potential mail voters whose votes were lost in 2008. If our
goal is to calculate the number of lost votes through the mail-ballot
route, these estimates are probably too high. Because non-voters are
well known for rationalizing their failure to vote,56 we must treat any
56. See, e.g., Simon Jackman, Correcting Surveys for Non-response and Measure-
ment Error Using Auxiliary Information, 18 ELECTORAL STUD. 7, 13–14 (1999);
Brian D. Silver et al., Who Overreports Voting?, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 613, 614
(1986).
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survey-based estimate of the number of non-delivered absentee ballots
with caution. Because voting is a socially desirable behavior, there are
strong psychological pressures prompting non-voters to blame the ac-
tions of others, including election administrators, for their failure to
vote.
However, even if the estimated number of unfulfilled requests for
a mail ballot is off by an order of magnitude—that is, the correct esti-
mate is closer to 390,000 than 3.9 million—the resulting lost vote esti-
mate is still around 4.1 million, or a lost vote rate of 13%.
Turning our attention to the other estimates, the other “leaks” in
the pipeline are not due entirely to errors beyond the voter’s control. A
ballot that is mailed out but not returned may reflect a voter’s decision
not to cast a vote after all, or a decision to go to the polls on Election
Day instead.57 Still, if we consider all the non-returned ballots as re-
flecting these voters’ conscious decision to abstain, after they have
gone through the effort to obtain an absentee ballot, it implies that the
abstention rate among mail-in voters is 12%, an implausibly high rate.
Because many states do not record why absentee ballots are re-
jected, we cannot say with certainty why nearly one million returned
mail-in ballots went uncounted.58 Among states that do record why
absentee ballots are rejected, the primary reason is the failure to return
the ballot before the deadline.59 A variety of reasons involving miss-
ing signatures are also common.60
Caveats noted, the number of potentially lost ballots through the
vote-by-mail channel is significant, especially compared to estimates
that focus on in-person voting. The 22% lost vote rate through the
vote-by-mail channel is significantly larger than the overall rate of 4%
estimated for all voters by the VTP in 2000. Even if future research
with better data narrows the gap, there is no doubt that the magnitude
of the phenomenon demands attention.
57. Los Angeles County, California alone reported that 33,078 absentee ballots
were rejected because the voter also voted a provisional ballot. EAVS Dataset, supra
note 25. These are probably voters who did not remember that they had already voted R
absentee, or who doubted their absentee ballot would be counted, for whatever reason.
58. Id., Questions C5a–C5v. Of the 4,517 units that were asked to respond to the
questionnaire, 947 reported no reasons for why absentee ballots were rejected. Id.
59. Id., Question C5a.
60. Id., Questions C5b (voter signature), C5c (witness signature), C5d (non-match-
ing signature), C5e (election official signature).
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V.
VOTE-BY-MAIL AND RESIDUAL VOTES
The analysis thus far has focused on the distribution channel of
ballots as the major source of lost mail votes. Ballots can also be lost
if the ballot-marking and -counting process fails. This is a problem
shared with more traditional in-person voting, which is the context in
which this problem has generally been studied.61 Analogous problems
in the mail ballot domain have gone almost entirely unstudied, even
though there are reasons to believe that they may be more acute.
Research following the 2000 presidential election demonstrated
that votes can be lost when voters are confused by the layout of the
ballot or when the voting technology malfunctions.62 Voter confusion
and machine malfunction can lead to unintended over- and under-
votes, both of which are treated as blank ballots for the purposes of
counting votes.63 The problem of over- and under-votes together is
sometimes termed the “residual vote” problem.64
HAVA mandated that in-person voting technologies inform vot-
ers when they over- or under-vote their ballot, and that these technolo-
61. Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Residual Votes Attributable to
Technology, 67 J. POL. 365, 366 (2005); Stewart, supra note 15; Jonathan N. Wand et R
al., The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County,
Florida, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 793, 795–96 (2001); see Caltech/MIT Voting Tech-
nology Project, supra note 4, at 20–23; Douglas W. Jones, Chad—From Waste Prod-
uct to Headline, http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/cards/chad.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2010).
62. See Ansolabehere & Stewart, supra note 61, at 366; Stewart, supra note 15, at R
168; Wand, supra note 61, at 795–96; Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra R
note 4, at 27; Jones, supra note 61. R
63. Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, supra note 4, at 23.
64. A “residual vote” is simply a ballot that is untallied because it is over- or under-
voted. The residual vote rate is calculated by dividing the number of residual votes by
the number of ballots presented for counting, or alternatively, the number of voters
who check in at the polls. Residual vote analysis is usually done on the race at the top
of the ballot, such as president, but in principle it can be applied to any race on a
ballot, as the discussion of San Francisco below demonstrates. For research involving
residual votes, see generally R. Michael Alvarez et al., Studying Elections: Data
Quality and Pitfalls in Measuring the Effects of Voting Technologies, 33 POL’Y STUD.
J. 15 (2005); Stephen Ansolabehere, Voting Machines, Race, and Equal Protection, 1
ELECTION L. J. 61 (2002); Ansolabehere & Stewart, supra note 61; Justin Buchler et R
al., Punch Card Technology and the Racial Gap in Residual Votes, 2 PERSP. ON POL.
517 (2004); Michael C. Herron & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Black Candidates and Black
Voters: Assessing the Impact of Candidate Race on Uncounted Vote Rates, 67 J. POL.
154 (2005); Jonathan I. Leib & Jason Dittmer, Florida’s Residual Votes, Voting Tech-
nology, and the 2000 Election, 21 POL. GEOGRAPHY 91 (2002); Donald P. Moynihan
& Carol L. Silva, What Is the Future of Studying Elections? Making the Case for a
New Approach, 33 POL’Y STUD. J. 31 (2005); Stewart, supra note 15. R
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gies provide a way to correct such errors.65 Mail-in ballots are exempt
from this second chance feedback requirement, which raises the possi-
bility that mail ballots will more likely contain unintentional residual
votes than in-person ballots. Unfortunately, the research on this topic
has been minimal, in large part because very few states break down
residual vote rates by voting mode—in-person vs. absentee.
Furthermore, even if residual vote rates were reported for differ-
ent voting modes, it is unclear what we would make of these compari-
sons, since voters do not randomly distribute themselves into the in-
person and vote-by-mail categories.66 In states where absentee ballot-
ing is primarily used for the convenience of a few voters, mail-in vot-
ers tend to be better educated and have higher incomes than in-person
voters.67 This population tends to produce relatively fewer residual
votes.68 The residual vote rate of mail-in ballots could therefore be
lower than in-person ballots, simply for demographic reasons.
With this caveat in mind, there is no statistical evidence yet that a
rise in vote-by-mail has led to an increase in the residual vote rate at
the top of the ticket. The simplest way to test this relationship is to
calculate the correlation across states of the changes in the vote-by-
mail rate and the residual vote rate from 2000 to 2008. The correlation
is an anemic -.06, which is no different than random chance.
A more sophisticated way to test whether the rise of vote-by-mail
has led to an increase in the residual vote rate is to include a measure
of the vote-by-mail rate in a larger regression model that tests for
changes in the residual vote rate at a lower degree of aggregation
(such as the county), controlling for factors such as changes in voting
technology, turnout, and other local conditions. Prior research has
done precisely this, and I adapt these previous estimation techniques
65. Help America Vote Act § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (2006).
66. Robert M. Stein, Early Voting, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 57, 59 (1998); JOHN MARK
HANSEN, EARLY VOTING, UNRESTRICTED ABSENTEE VOTING, AND VOTING BY MAIL 1
(2001), http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReform/NCFER/hansen_chap5_
early.pdf.
67. For instance, in the SPAE, the average household income of in-person voters
was $65,100, compared to $67,100 for in-person early voters and $72,300 for absen-
tee and mail voters. SPAE, supra note 5, at 13–14. The average education for in-
person voters was 13.7 years, compared to 13.9 for early voters and 14.1 years for
mail voters. Id.
68. David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, Ballot Design and Unrecorded Votes on
Paper-Based Ballots, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 508, 523 (2005); David C. Kimball &
Martha Kropf, Voting Technology, Ballot Measures, and Residual Votes, 36 AM. POL.
RES. 479, 492 (2008); Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Roll-Off at the Top of the
Ballot: Intentional Undervoting in American Presidential Elections, 31 POL. & POL’Y
575, 584 (2003); Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Voided Ballots in the 1996 Presi-
dential Election: A County-Level Analysis, 65 J. POL. 881, 889 (2003).
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here.69 Unfortunately, we do not have county-by-county vote-by-mail
rates for all counties across the country, and so a comprehensive test is
currently impossible to conduct. However, we can augment these
models by including the state-level measure of the vote-by-mail rate
for each election year as an additional control, and adding 2008 elec-
tion returns to the analysis, in order to gain greater statistical leverage.
The appendix contains the details of the regression analysis.70
The most important finding from a regression analysis of these data is
that, in states that have seen the biggest increase in vote-by-mail rates
over the past decade, the residual vote rates have fallen the most. The
size of the effect predicts that, on average, a one standard deviation
increase in the vote-by-mail rate in a state would reduce the residual
vote rate of a county by 1.0% points. Therefore, the initial evidence
shows that a rise in vote-by-mail has not led to a rash of new residual
votes at the top of the ticket.
Another confounding factor in examining the residual vote rate of
mail-in ballots is that some voters do not return all the ballot cards.
This occurs infrequently when voters vote in person. San Francisco,
California provides a cautionary illustration from 2008. Typical of
California counties, the ballot in San Francisco in the November 2008
general election had to accommodate numerous races. Not only were
there races for U.S. President, U.S. House, Superior Court, Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART) directors (for some precincts), County Board of
Education (vote for four), County Board of Supervisors (rank-choice),
and Community College Board (vote for four), but there were also
twenty-two county-wide propositions and twelve state-wide proposi-
tions.71 To accommodate all of these races, the optical scan ballot was
distributed across four ballot cards, on which cards information was
printed on both the front and back.72 Card 1 contained the federal,
state, and local offices, printed on the front and back. Card 2 contained
the state propositions, with propositions 1A–5 printed on the front and
6–12 printed on the back. Card 3 contained the county measures, with
measures A–J on the front and measures K–V on the back. Card 4
contained the rank-choice ballot for supervisors.
69. Ansolabehere & Stewart, supra note 61; Stewart, supra note 15. R
70. See infra Appendix.
71. DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, NOVEM-
BER 4, 2008 STATEMENT OF VOTES, http://www.sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elec-
tions/ElectionsArchives/2008/november/SOV_081104.pdf [hereinafter SAN
FRANCISCO 2008 STATEMENT OF VOTES].
72. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAMPLE OFFICIAL BALLOT, NOVEMBER
4, 2008, BALLOT STYLE 39 (on file with author).
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San Francisco is not unique in having a complicated ballot.73
What makes it unique is that it publishes precinct-by-precinct statistics
that record not only the number of votes for each candidate by election
mode (in-person or absentee), but also publishes the number of cards
that were physically returned for counting. Table 1 reports the basic
statistics.
TABLE 1: RETURN RATES OF BALLOT CARDS, SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 2008 GENERAL ELECTION
In-person, not returned Absentee, not returned Total, not returned
N Pct. N Pct. N Pct.
Card 1 — — — — — —
Card 2 279 0.13% 4,697 2.6% 4,976 1.3%
Card 3 674 0.32% 5,943 3.3% 6,617 1.7%
N 209,527 178,585 388,122
Card 4 1,727 1.4% 5,906 5.5% 7,633 3.3%
N 127,027 107,651 234,678
Source: Department of Elections, City and County of San Francisco, Nov. 4, 2008 Statement
of Votes, http://www.sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/ElectionsArchives/2008/november/
SOV_081104.pdf.
Overall, 388,122 first cards were returned to be counted: 209,527
via the in-person route and 178,585 by mail. The San Francisco Elec-
tions Department published these numbers as the total turnout for the
city and county, so they will be used as the denominators in calculat-
ing the non-return rate of the other cards.74 A very small fraction of
Cards 2 and 3 were not returned to be counted in the in-person pre-
cincts: 0.13% and 0.32%, respectively. Among the absentee ballots, a
73. For instance, in the November 4, 2008 general election, after Chicago residents
voted in approximately two dozen races on the front of their ballots, they turned them
over to face 71 judicial retention questions on the back of the ballot. CITY OF CHI-
CAGO, SPECIMEN GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, BALLOT STYLE
218, http://www.chicagoelections.com/nov2008ballot/es214.pdf. Harris County,
Texas (Houston) voters faced forty countywide partisan elections for various judicial
positions, in addition to nine statewide offices and a large number of special district
elections, depending on one’s residence. HARRIS COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE, CUMULA-
TIVE REPORT, GENERAL AND SPECIAL ELECTIONS, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, http://
www.harrisvotes.net/HISTORY/110408/Cumulative/cumulative.pdf.
74. San Francisco lists these numbers as the “number of voters” in its turnout report
and in its Statement of Votes. See Historical Voter Turnout, DEPARTMENT OF ELEC-
TIONS, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, http://www.sfgov2.org/index.aspx?
page=1670 (last visited June 1, 2010); SAN FRANCISCO 2008 STATEMENT OF VOTES,
supra note 71. It is likely that some (small) number of voters failed to return Card 1, R
while still returning one of the other voting cards. This number is unreported by the
San Francisco Election Department, so I will follow their convention and treat the
number of returned Card 1s as the number of voters.
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much larger fraction, 2.6% and 3.3%, of Cards 2 and 3 were not re-
turned. Calculating the non-return rates of Card 4 is more difficult,
because races for the Board of Supervisors were not held in every
supervisory district in 2008. Thus, the denominator is calculated by
adding the number of Card 1’s returned in the precincts in which Su-
pervisor elections were held. In total, there were 234,678 voters in the
precincts with supervisory races, 127,027 in-person and 107,651 by
mail. The in-person non-return rate of Card 4 was 1.4%, compared to
5.5% for absentee ballots.
Stated another way, although absentee voters constituted only
46% of ballots cast in San Francisco in 2008, they accounted for be-
tween 77% and 94% of the ballot cards that were not returned for
counting in 2008.
The failure to return cards to be counted affects the residual vote
rate significantly, especially for “down-ballot” races that appear on
every card but the first. This is illustrated in Table 2, which calculates
the residual vote rate of each race that appeared first on each of the
four ballot cards, along with the residual vote rate for Proposition 8
(gay marriage), which drew national attention. Residual vote rates are
calculated using two denominators. The first is the total number of
voters for that mode, that is, total turnout. The second is the total num-
ber of cards returned for that mode.
TABLE 2: RESIDUAL VOTE RATE DUE TO NON-RETURNED BALLOT
CARDS, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 2008
GENERAL ELECTION
In-person residual votes Absentee residual votes
As pct. As pct. As pct. As pct.
Top office of cards of all of cards of all
on card Number returned voters Number returned voters
Card 1 President 2,075 1.0% 1.0% 2,241 1.3% 1.3%
Card 2 Prop. A1 13,760 6.6% 6.7% 9,261 5.3% 7.8%
(Prop. 8) 5,671 2.7% 2.8% 4,438 2.6% 5.1%
Card 3 Meas. A 14,547 7.0% 7.3% 8,304 4.8% 8.0%
Card 4 County Bd. 18,561 14.8% 16.0% 8,520 8.4% 13.4%
Source: Department of Elections, City and County of San Francisco, Nov. 4, 2008 Statement
of Votes, http://www.sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/ElectionsArchives/2008/november/
SOV_081104.pdf.
The residual vote rate using all voters as the denominator is al-
ways higher than the rate using the number of returned cards. Because
the number of non-returned cards is so much greater among absentee
voters, the two rates diverge most significantly among these voters.
Ironically enough, one of the races where the divergence may have
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been the most significant was Proposition 8, which passed statewide,
restricting marriage in California to opposite-sex couples.75 Had ab-
sentee ballots not experienced the disproportionate “unreturned card”
problem, San Francisco County would have likely contributed an ad-
ditional 1,845 net votes against the proposition.76 These additional
votes would not have swung the result the other way,77 but they are
significant. A much smaller number of residual votes due to voter er-
ror determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential election in Flor-
ida,78 so it is certainly possible that non-returned ballot cards could
determine whether a ballot measure is adopted.
Not all states have ballots as complicated as California’s, but the
United States is known for its long ballots. San Francisco provides
insights into how the rise of vote-by-mail may either exacerbate or
ameliorate the lost-votes problem that emerges because of the length
and complexity of American ballots.
CONCLUSION
If 20%, or even 10%, of voters who stood in line on Election Day
were turned away, there would be national outrage. The estimates pro-
vided by this paper suggest that the equivalent may be happening
among voters who seek to cast their ballots by mail, and yet there is
nary a comment.
75. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008,
GENERAL ELECTION 60–62 (2008), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/
sov_complete.pdf.
76. The 1,845 figure is arrived at as follows. First, assume that the non-return rate
for absentee Card 2 ballots in San Francisco had been the same as the in-person rate,
0.13%. That would have resulted in an additional 4,465 Card 2s being returned. Sec-
ond, assume that support for Proposition 8 among these additional cards would have
been distributed the same way as other absentee voters—28.1% yes, 63.4% no, 2.5%
under-vote, and 0.05% over-vote. (The in-person percentages were less favorable to
the Proposition—20.9% yes, 76.4% no, 2.7% under-vote, and 0.5% over-vote.) This
yields 1,253 votes yes and 3,098 votes no, with 112 ballots under-voted and 2 ballots
over-voted. 3,098 (no) minus 1,253 (yes) equals 1,845.
77. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 75, at 13. R
78. Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Wrong Man Is President! Overvotes in the 2000
Presidential Election in Florida, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 525, 536 (2004) (“Bush’s official,
537-vote margin of victory”); Wand et al., supra note 61, at 804 (noting studies of the R
residual votes showing margins of as low as 152 votes). As an aside, the residual vote
rate in San Francisco was generally higher (regardless of the denominator) for absen-
tee ballots than for in-person voting, except for the San Francisco County Supervisor
races, in which the absentee residual vote rate was actually lower, even when we
account for the fact that many more ballot cards were simply not returned. This pro-
vides some evidence in favor of the proposition that mail-in ballots may help voters
navigate complicated situations, such as the new ranked-choice option in San
Francisco.
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Three major objections may be lodged against the basic conclu-
sions of this paper. First, it draws conclusions based on poor data.
Second, it treats mail voters as innocent victims of election adminis-
tration and the postal service. Third, even though the schematic view
of voting-by-mail presented in Figure 2 is complicated, it is not com-
plicated enough.
Each of these objections contains elements of truth, although they
are ultimately irrelevant. The analysis is only as strong as the data
supporting it. Close attention to the EAVS reveals that even the best
source of nationally comparable data about election administration
contains important gaps and inconsistencies. Yet while the amount of
missing data in the EAVS might make us hesitant to trust its findings
about the elections of 2004 and 2006, the 2008 study is substantially
complete, at least as far as voting by mail is concerned. Instead, the
problems are due to more vexing problems that are difficult to solve,
such as inconsistent definitions across states. Similarly, the SPAE is
based on self-reporting by voters who may feel pressured to give so-
cially acceptable answers to questions about how they fulfilled their
highest civic duty.
Still, even when we acknowledge the shortcomings of the data, it
does not undermine efforts to quantify the general scope of the lost
vote problem in the vote-by-mail context. Rather, the data shortcom-
ings argue in favor of redoubling efforts to make the best data we have
even better.
The question of who to blame for lost votes naturally arises in an
analysis such as this. Are lost votes fundamentally the fault of voters?
Election administrators? The Postal Service? Over-zealous campaign
staff? The cliche´d, but true, answer is “all of the above.” Unfortu-
nately, because election officials and voters often harbor contradictory
expectations about the use of mail-in ballots, it is not always clear how
to assign responsibility for lapses in the system. Therefore, it is not
always normatively clear what would be the best way to limit lost
votes, or how much positive effort election officials should exert to
make sure that mail-in ballots are counted.
To take as an example the simplest of reasons for mail votes be-
ing lost, consider ballots that are rejected because of a missing signa-
ture on the ballot’s return envelope. Is this a lost vote we should worry
about? If the missing signature is due to the sloppiness or inattention
of the voter, maybe not. We are often reminded that the reason for
having an educated electorate is so that we can guard our rights our-
selves. The mark of an educated voter is attention to details like sign-
ing absentee ballots. On the other hand, if the mistake results from
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confusing instructions that were written in strict compliance with state
law, maybe we ought to be concerned. Research has consistently
shown that election materials often seem designed to confuse voters
and produce mistakes.79
Where vote-by-mail is required, the question about where to as-
sign responsibility shifts attention away from the voters. In these
cases, it is hard to argue that voters must fully assume the risks in
return for the added convenience of vote-by-mail; election officials
must shoulder more of the responsibility to guard against lost votes. If
they do not, election officials risk greater skepticism among the
public.
There is evidence that such skepticism may already be present in
the two states that require residents to vote by mail. In the SPAE,
respondents were asked, “How confident are you that your vote in the
General Election was counted as you intended?” Nationwide, 69% of
respondents answered “very confident.”80 In Oregon, the percentage
was 63%; in Washington, it was 52%. Interestingly, when asked
whether they supported or opposed laws that mandate that all votes be
cast by mail, 34% of Oregon voters opposed such laws, as did 47% of
Washington voters.81 The nationwide level of opposition was 84%.
Thus, while most Oregonians and Washingtonians support mandatory
vote-by-mail, significant minorities in each state do not.
Among respondents who opposed vote-by-mail in Oregon and
Washington, 50% and 44%, respectively, answered that they were
very confident that their ballots were counted as intended. In contrast,
62% and 61% of those in the two states who supported vote-by-mail
said they were very confident. This relationship between confidence
and attitudes about voting by mail did not exist in the rest of the na-
tion. In other words, in Oregon and Washington, attitudes about
mandatory vote-by-mail color voters’ opinions about whether they
trust the vote count, a pattern unobserved in the rest of the nation
without mandatory vote-by-mail.82
It is possible that in the future, Oregon and Washington voters
who oppose vote-by-mail may become less skeptical about votes be-
ing counted properly as they gain experience with the vote-by-mail
79. See generally MARCIA LAUSEN, DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY: BALLOT AND ELEC-
TION DESIGN (2007).
80. SPAE, supra note 5, at 29–32.
81. Id.
82. California has a mandatory vote-by-mail system that only affects a very small
number of voters. Therefore, California is treated as a state without mandatory vote-
by-mail.
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system. However, their skepticism may persist. The point is that a sig-
nificant minority of Oregon and Washington voters apparently are vot-
ing by mail against their wishes; election officials in these states have
an obligation to these voters to take extra precautions to ensure that
the vote-by-mail pipeline performs as well as the in-person pipeline.
Finally, although some may object because the pipeline metaphor
illustrated in Figure 2 is overly complicated, others may argue it is not
complicated enough. That is, they may observe that each state handles
voting by mail differently, arguing that each state’s processes, defini-
tions, and normative standards must be taken into account. Each state
has a unique pipeline. Others may note that there are fundamental dif-
ferences between situations involving for-cause absentee voting (that
is, the relatively small number of absentee ballots because the voter is
sick, out of town, etc.), permanent absentee voting, and mandatory
vote-by-mail. As suggested above, if a state requires all residents to
vote by mail, as opposed to regarding vote-by-mail to be purely for the
convenience of a limited number of voters, election officials could be
considered to have a greater normative obligation to make sure all by-
mail ballots are actually counted. Finally, the logistical success of the
mail channel hinges more critically on the quality of the registration
lists when voters are required to vote by mail or when states establish
permanent absentee databases.
The first objection, about nationwide heterogeneity in voting by
mail, implies that scientific analysis of the vote-by-mail phenomenon
is impossible, a position fundamentally at odds with the underlying
premises of this article. More challenging to this paper’s analysis is
the objection that there are three different types of voting by mail that
must be analyzed separately. This challenge implies the need for more
research. If this additional research helps to better quantify the quality
of the voter registration lists that are used across the country, this
would all be for the better.
One of the supreme ironies of the butterfly ballot problem in
Palm Beach County, Florida in 2000 is that the county Supervisor of
Elections deliberately chose this unusual ballot layout to solve a prob-
lem she faced. If the extremely long list of candidates on the ballot
had been presented traditionally, in a single column, the necessary
font size would have been so small that voters with limited eyesight
could not have read the ballot. The butterfly ballot allowed the use of
a larger, more readable font. The Supervisor was just trying to be
helpful. The result was a disaster.
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The drift toward more voting by mail is similarly benign. Busy
voters demand convenience. Harried election officials demand greater
control over the process. Cash-strapped local governments demand
greater efficiencies. These are all valid reasons to encourage more vot-
ers to use the mail. But what are the hidden costs and trade-offs? As
Palm Beach County demonstrated, significant dangers lurk when we
make changes to how we vote before we understand all of the ramifi-
cations. As voting by mail seems destined to spread even further, it is
incumbent upon us to understand better what this means in terms of
lost votes.
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APPENDIX
This appendix reports a fixed effects regression that estimates the
degree to which the residual vote rate for president is related to the
prevalence of vote-by-mail in a state. The model is adopted from re-
search conducted by Ansolabehere and Stewart, who studied the rela-
tionship between voting technology and residual vote rates for the
1988 to 2004 elections.83 Here, I start with a simple model that pools
together observations from 2000, 2004, and 2008. The dependent vari-
able is the residual vote rate in a county for a particular election year.
The independent variables are (1) a series of dummy variables that
indicate whether a county used a particular type of voting technology
(punch card, paper, mechanical lever machine, optical scan, DRE, or
mixed) in an election year, zero otherwise; (2) a dummy variable for
each election year; and (3) the logarithm of turnout (i.e., votes cast).84
A variable equal to the percentage of votes cast in the state to which
the county belongs in the election year in question is added to this
basic setup.85
The results of the regression are reported in Table A1.
The results that are relevant to this paper are contained in the first
line of the table, which reports the coefficient associated with the per-
centage of mail ballots cast in the state. Substantively, the effect is
relatively small. For instance, a state that increased its vote-by-mail
percentage from 20% to 30% (from 0.20 to 0.30) would experience a
drop in the residual vote rate of 0.12 percentage points in each county.
However, because the same state rate is applied to each county in a
state, this variable contains measurement error, since it is being used
as an indicator of the vote-by-mail rate in each county. Therefore, it is
likely that if we could have measured the vote-by-mail rate at the
county level, the effect would have been even greater.
83. Ansolabehere & Stewart, supra note 61; Stewart, supra note 15. R
84. The omitted categories for the dummy variables are optical scan voting ma-
chines and the year 2000.
85. The state is used, rather than the county, because we do not have nationwide
estimates of the number of ballots cast by mail in each county.
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TABLE A1: RESIDUAL VOTE RATE AND VOTES CAST BY MAIL,
2000–2008. (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
Variable Coefficient
% state ballots -0.012
cast by mail (0.001)
Voting technology
Optical scanning Omitted category
Punch cards 0.0033
(0.0007)
Mechanical lever -0.022
machine (0.001)
Paper -0.017
(0.005)
DRE -0.0042
(0.0007)
Election year
2000 Omitted category
2004 -0.015
(0.0006)
2008 -0.017
(0.0008)
Log(turnout) 0.074
(0.002)
Intercept -0.86
(0.03)
N 13,011
R2 .89
Fixed effects
(county)
Number of 4,688
categories
F-test F(4687,8314) =
13,8 (p<.0001)
